I believe that what you believe is not what I believe that you believe

Belief is commonly known as acceptance of something that has not been verified as truth.
Generally, the acceptance of the existence of fairies, flat earth, monsters in closets, or Thor, would be considered beliefs by virtually everyone. These are examples of beliefs for which the reason for the belief (for most people) is hearsay or pure fantasy. Believers in such things would have no supporting data for their belief, correlational events to which they are attributed, or any appeal to reason. In the purest sense of it, their belief is a False Belief.

Less generally, the acceptance of the existence of an Aether, out-of-body travel, relativity, and near-death experiences are considered beliefs by a significant number of people (though not necessarily most). These beliefs differ from the former in that they are related to or explain some phenomena, but lack any verifiability for themselves. For instance near-death experiences are real experiences, but because of their lack of repeatability and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of the study of the phenomena (the subject’s body is unconscious), they are mostly closed to direct scientific scrutiny. On the other hand, relativity is a theory about the mechanism behind an observed phenomenon, where the proposed mechanism cannot be shown to exist or to be capable of causal power.

The beliefs which are most widely accepted are beliefs related directly to phenomena. The belief that the sun will rise tomorrow is a belief with a basis in fact. I have seen that the sun has risen every day of my life, have never heard anyone speak of a day where the sun hasn’t risen, and have heard evidence from scientists that the sun will rise tomorrow and for every day for several billion years. They tell me that on those days when I can’t see the sun, it still rises behind whatever obscures it. There is a theory about the motion and positioning of the planets in relation to the sun which has enough explanatory power for me to be able to accept the explanation given. Although such beliefs are virtually universally accepted to be true, they are rarely thought of as being belief; they are facts.

But are these beliefs actually facts? From a theoretical perspective, one can easily admit that the belief that the sun will rise tomorrow is indeed a belief, but are such beliefs acted upon as facts? I think this is the case more often than not. The belief that the sun will rise tomorrow isn’t necessarily a belief about the sun, predictability, or knowledge about the motion of the solar system; it is a belief about a belief. What does that mean? I didn’t know when I typed it, but I’m going to go with it.

So what is the belief that the sun will rise tomorrow actually a belief in? As with any other belief, it could be a belief in anything. Some people might believe in what others say; some might believe in the constancy of the laws or nature; some believe in the solar model, while some probably believe in a divine origin for sunrises. In these cases, the belief in the sun rising tomorrow is really a belief in what follows from a prior belief. To bring the belief about the sun rising into question is to really bring the prior belief into question. To bring the prior belief into question probably brings a deeper-level prior belief into question. But perhaps the sun won’t rise because an asteroid hits the earth and stops its rotation, or perhaps God is displeased with us and He stops the planet; but how difficult would it be to switch from the solar model to God’s doings?

Religious folks might say that an asteroid is God’s way of showing his displeasure. Scientists might go on a search for “inertions” which, seemingly, we had run out of. Undoubtedly, others would say that the sun has never risen and that it is absurd to think it ever had.

I can see that some of you think that if such a thing happened, it would simply invalidate the old model and that soon enough a better theory would be put forth. The new data would be a welcome addition to past discoveries and would represent a turning-point in our understanding of the universe. That sounds like a fine attitude to me. But what if it only happened once? What if the earth stopped spinning for one day and then resumed 24 hours later where it had left off as if nothing else had occurred?

Belief can take many different forms. Some of them can be quite useful, while others can be useless or worse. Dr. Grayling says that we should not believe in thing for which we have no reason to believe. But what constitutes good reason? Common sense? Logic? Obviously, anyone who has actually seen a fairy has reason to believe that they exist. Aside from them, those who believe in metaphorical fairies, or in the idea of fairies, there exists the realm of rational justification.

“I’ve not seen a fairy and neither has anyone I know.”

In a simple consideration of this statement, we can easily see that there is no reason for this person to believe in fairies. Likewise, there is no reason for them to believe that the existence of fairies is impossible. For this person, the existence of fairies lies completely in the realm of possibility, but outside the realm of reality. In order to have a preference for or against fairies, he would have to accept in a model in which there is some certainty about them. Can certainty come without proof?

In the mole example, I said that without seeing a mole, I couldn’t prove that a mole caused the tunnels. However, where I live, I have only ever seen moles make tunnels of this size and shape. Chipmunks also make tunnels, but every one I have seen them use has been a deep tunnel with no visible surface features besides the hole. I have never seen any other types of burrowing animals in my yard. Based on what I know, it seems likely that these particular tunnels were caused by moles. But, can I make claims of likelihood? Could I claim that it is not possible for any other animal to have caused the tunnels? Do I believe a mole caused the tunnels because I know something about these tunnels, or because according to my model a mole probably did it?

Let’s say that I have 95% certainty that a mole created the tunnels based on a vast study of peerless quality on tunnel causing events in my area. I then hop into a time machine and catch the animal while it digs the holes and find that it’s a weasel. Well, I didn’t claim 100% certainty, at least.

The point of all this is that no matter how well I test, how predictive and explanatory my models are, they offer no certainty unless I somehow know the answer. Yes, I agree that the purpose of science is to arrive at ever more accurate theories through rigorous testing and impeccable standards, but that isn’t what I’ve been going on about; I have been writing about belief and the justifications for it. So far, I’ve seen no reason to believe in anything but an open realm of possibility. But that doesn’t sound half-bad in a romantic sort of way.

More useless drivel coming soon…