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Friday, August 10, 2007

Proving God Doesn't Exist or; I'm Right, You're Wrong

How do we know what we know? How do we know what is true? How do we know what is false? If I claim to know what you are thinking about at this moment, would you believe me? Could you authoritatively say that I didn’t know? If you answered “yes”, you would probably have done so based on the belief that people cannot know what other people are thinking without being told. Perhaps you have this belief because nobody has ever demonstrated the ability to read other people’s minds, or because someone you trust has told you so. But how would you know if you were correct? Like some, you may think it likely that I possess no such ability, but recognize the possibility that I do. Like some others, you may say that humans do not possess the ability to read minds and so it is impossible for me to possess it, either.

AC Grayling, a professor of philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London, might believe the latter. In this excellent article, he writes about the foolishness of believing in fairies to show why certain people should study epistemology (study of knowledge).

http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/ac_grayling/2007/07/facts_and_fairydust.html

Dr. Grayling might have a point. As he says, it would be irrational to believe in something that can not be shown to exist; something unavailable for scrutiny. But what is a fairy? He seems to view them as a supposed classification of hominid with supernatural powers that are known to cause mischief or make shoes. Is that what they are? Could they be anything else?

There are several metaclassifications of phenomena for which we have come up with names and descriptions. There are physical objects, effects, unseen causes, ideas, and correlated organizations of the former. Dr. Grayling seems to be primarily concerned with fairies as physical objects, although he clearly recognizes the existence of the idea of fairies. However, the existence of fairies as a theory of causation for a classification of real events is a distinct possibility of their origin because people, by definition, only come up with descriptions based on prior knowledge. It is also a possibility that with a description from prior knowledge, people would attribute some of the known characteristics of the descriptor to the described phenomena. The addition of the latter does not invalidate the former.

Although I find it entertaining to analyze the possibilities, it does not help us to understand anything about Dr. Grayling’s argument about epistemology. Is he saying that the existence of fairies is impossible because they have never been proven to exist? It is doubtful that he is, although he may possess knowledge of their non-existence, in which case he would (by his own rationale) be required to show us his work. If Dr. Grayling has such knowledge but is incapable of proving it to be true, should we listen to him? What would it mean if he said we should? If someone saw a fairy that refused to allow themselves to be seen by anyone else, should they disregard their perceptions until they could prove it to others?

Back to the use of fairies as an explanation for real-world events; at one time, it was common for people to explain occurrences with beings that were seemingly unobservable. Why would people do this? One reason is that people simply believed that everything was caused by a being. The idea of a clockwork universe would probably have been beyond imagination at that time. Certainly, much of the knowledge we take for granted was unavailable to these people, so they came up with theories that fit what they knew about. Perhaps an astute individual would have asked about alternative theories. Could small animals cause these things? Could it be God? Could it be that mischievous beings are not the basis for causation?

Assuming that people did not see fairies, questioning the fundamental belief that small beings caused things to happen would have opened people’s eyes to other possibilities; but people are hard-pressed to give up their beliefs. Belief, as Dr. Grayling may agree, is very problematic and probably unnecessary. Or would he? I shall explore this possibility in my next entry.

Cheers!

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